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Introduction
In Hollingsworth v. Perry,1 the United States Supreme Court 
ruled that state ballot initiatives’ official proponents lack standing 
to defend their enacted initiative in federal courts. This ruling has 
prompted a broad concern among initiative proponents and other 
supporters: if proponents lack standing and if state officials — who 
do have standing — refuse to defend initiatives, then some initiatives 
may go undefended. Two separate initiatives, Propositions 54 and 60, 
appeared on California’s November 8, 2016, ballot. They attempted 
to dodge Hollingsworth in different ways. 
Proposition 60, which failed to pass, would have regulated 
the adult film industry by, inter alia, mandating condom use in films 
produced in California.2 Proposition 60’s first standing provision 
specified that the proponent is to pay a $10,000 penalty if Proposition 
60 is invalidated by a court.3 The prospect of this penalty, the 
proponent would argue, poses a particularized and concrete injury to 
him.4 Proposition 60’s second standing provision specified that the 
state shall employ the proponent and grant him or her the authority 
to defend the initiative if the state’s attorney general fails to defend 
the initiative.5
Proposition 54, which did pass, was an initiative with 
constitutional and statutory provisions. It will reform state legislative 
procedures by, inter alia, mandating that any bill be posted on the 
Internet at least seventy-two hours before the legislature approves 
it.6 One of Proposition 54’s provisions eschews the need for actual 
1 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
2 Proposition 60: California Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act, in Cal. Sec’y of 
State, Official Voter Information Guide 148-54 (Aug. 15, 2016), 
http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2016/general/en/pdf/text-proposed-laws.pdf#prop60 
[hereinafter Proposition 60]. California’s voters rejected Proposition 60; it received 
only 46.3 percent of the popular vote. Statement of Vote Summary Pages, Cal. Sec’y 
of State 12 (2016), http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2016-general/sov/06-
sov-summary.pdf.
3 Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 7.
4 See discussion infra Part II-A.
5 Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 10.
6 Proposition 54: the California Legislature Transparency Act, in Cal. Sec’y of State, 
Official Voter Information Guide 125-28 (Aug. 15, 2016), http://
vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2016/general/en/pdf/text-proposed-laws.pdf#prop54 
[hereinafter Proposition 54]. California’s voters approved Proposition 54; it 
received over 65 percent of the popular vote. See http://elections.cdn.sos.
ca.gov/sov/2016-general/sov/06-sov-summary.pdf. 
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standing; instead, it mandates that the California Attorney General file 
a notice of appeal from any judgment that Proposition 54 is invalid.7 
After such a notice is filed, Proposition 54’s proponents — and, 
perhaps, other interested parties — may participate as intervenors 
or as amici, even if they lack actual standing as appellants.8
This Article considers whether, notwithstanding Holling-
sworth, one or more of these various provisions — or scholars’ 
variations on them or their future progeny — would confer standing 
on or otherwise allow participation by initiative proponents in 
California and elsewhere. Part I reviews Hollingsworth and its 
aftermath against the backdrop of California’s initiative process 
and the Supreme Court’s doctrine of standing under Article III of 
the Constitution. Part II assesses the principal rationales available 
for sustaining standing under the types of provisions contained in 
Proposition 60 or under other variations designed to give proponents 
a sufficiently distinct stake in the outcome of legal challenges 
to establish standing. Part III assesses whether Proposition 54’s 
requirement that the Attorney General file a notice of appeal allows 
proponents to defend the initiative even in the absence of standing. 
The Article concludes that none of Proposition 60’s justifications 
avoid the obstacles to standing created by Hollingsworth and the 
Court’s wider standing doctrine. Thus, it appears that proponents 
of initiatives in California and other states with similar initiative 
provisions must devise other means of securing a place in court when 
state officials decline to defend their (the proponents’) initiative. 
One of those other means may be similar to Proposition 54, which 
may allow proponents some rights to participate, even if those rights 
are limited. 
I. The Impact of Hollingsworth on the Law of Standing
The Supreme Court has construed Article III of the United 
States Constitution to impose requirements for standing that 
can operate as stringent barriers to access to federal courts. In 
Hollingsworth, failure to meet these criteria defeated the efforts of 
proponents of Proposition 8 — an initiative to bar recognition of 
same-sex marriage in California — to serve as its legal defenders. 
The ruling has evoked strategies for conferring standing on initiative 
7 Proposition 54, supra note 6, §§ 6.1(c), 6.1(d).
8 See discussion infra Part III.
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proponents through state law, lest state officials effectively cause 
disfavored initiatives to fall for lack of defense.
A. The Requisites of Standing Under Article III
“Article III of the Constitution grants the federal courts 
the power to decide legal questions only in the presence of an 
actual ‘Cas[e]’ or ‘Controvers[y].’ This restriction requires a party 
invoking a federal court’s jurisdiction to demonstrate standing.”9 
While a comprehensive discussion of standing is beyond the scope 
of this Article,10 its essential elements can be briefly stated. First, 
a party must show that he or she has suffered a cognizable “injury 
in fact.”11 Second, that injury must be “fairly . . . trace[able]” to the 
government action to which the party objects.12 Third, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate the likelihood that the relief sought will redress 
 
9 Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 (2016) (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted). See also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U. S. 811, 818 (1997) 
(“No principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system 
of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction 
to actual cases or controversies.” (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 
426 U.S. 26, 37 (1976))). Most of the case law and commentary focuses on 
standing requirements for plaintiffs. E.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 
1540, 1547-48 (2016) (citing to, inter alia, Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U. S. 215, 231 (1990); 
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U. S. 490, 498 (1975)). However, defendants also are 
required to have standing, including a direct stake in the litigation’s outcome. 
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 217 (2011) (“One who seeks to 
initiate or continue proceedings in federal court must demonstrate, among 
other requirements, both standing to obtain the relief requested, and, in 
addition, an ‘ongoing interest in the dispute’ on the part of the opposing party 
that is sufficient to establish ‘concrete adverseness.’” (citations omitted)); 
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 701 (2011) (stating that both parties must 
maintain stake in outcome throughout litigation). See generally Matthew I. 
Hall, Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 Fordham L. 
Rev. 1539, 1550-57 (2012).
10 For an overview of Article III standing, see Ronald D. Rotunda & John 
E. Nowak, Treatise on Constitutional Law §2.13(f) (5th ed. 2012); 
William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L.J. 221 (1998); and 
Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing Doctrine Abolished or Waiting for a 
Comeback? Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 18 
U. Pa. J. Const. L. 213, 218-27 (2015).
11 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. 2334, 2341 (2014) (quoting 
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
12 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976).
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the injury.13 As these criteria suggest, parties have the burden of 
proving their standing to invoke a federal court’s jurisdiction.14 
Further, several additional features of standing doctrine are 
especially pertinent to the question of defending initiatives. First, 
federal law generally controls whether parties have standing in 
federal courts.15 Second, the requisite injury must be “concrete and 
particularized.”16 Particularization means that the injury affects the 
plaintiff “in a personal and individual way.”17 To qualify as concrete, 
an injury may be “intangible”18 or even “threatened” (as opposed 
to “actual”),19 but it cannot be a “generalized grievance,” no matter 
how sincerely held.20 Third, a state always has standing to defend the 
13 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561; see City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 128-
29 (1983) (requiring plaintiff to show that “the injuries he has alleged can 
be remedied or prevented by some form of judicial relief”). The Court has 
sometimes cast standing requirements in additional ways. See, e.g., Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968) (standing requires “a logical nexus between 
the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated”). The Court 
has announced, however, that injury in fact, traceability, and redressability 
constitute the essential components of standing. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61.
14 See Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2342; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-561.
15 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013). However, this general 
rule is subject to exception. For example, federal courts may look to state law 
as to who has standing to represent a corporation organized under the state’s 
laws or who has standing as a guardian to represent a minor child. See Elk 
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-78 (2004); Sanderling 
v. Comm’r, 66 T.C. 743, 750, 751 (1976). See also Karl Manheim, John S. 
Caragozian, & Donald Warner, Fixing Hollingsworth: Standing in Initiative 
Cases, 48 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1069, 1105-06 & nn.196-200 (2015). See generally 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(b)(2) & 17(b)(3). Also, as set forth in Section III-B-2 
infra, federal courts look to state law regarding an initiative’s severability (i.e., 
whether one invalid provision in an initiative invalidates the whole initiative 
or whether the invalid provision can be severed, with the remainder of the 
initiative surviving).
16 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Accord Susan B. Anthony List, 134 S. Ct. at 2341-42 
(2014); see Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007) (denying standing 
where plaintiffs “assert[ed] no particularized stake in the litigation”); Warth, 
422 U.S. at 501 (requiring allegation that injury to plaintiff is “distinct and 
palpable”); Allen v. Wright, 468 U. S. 737, 756 (1984); Sierra Club v. Morton, 
405 U.S. 727, 740–741, n. 16 (1972).
17 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).
18 Id. at 1549.
19 Id. at 1548 (internal quotation marks omitted); Valley Forge Christian College 
v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U. S. 464, 
472-73 (1982).
20 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662.
74 John S� Caragozian and Nat Stern
validity of its own laws.21 More generally, federal courts may accord 
states “special solicitude” in connection with standing.22 However, 
a state’s representative in federal litigation must be a state official, 
such as the attorney general; under Article III, “private parties” are 
ineligible to represent a state.23
B. Proposition 8 and Hollingsworth v. Perry
Most states, including California, allow voters to enact 
state laws through a ballot initiative.24 In California, an initiative 
is proposed by one or more registered voters who are formally 
designated as “proponents.”25 California initiative proponents’ 
responsibilities include drafting the initiative, submitting it to the 
State Attorney General (for administrative processing), gathering 
and submitting the requisite signatures to place the initiative on a 
statewide ballot, and authorizing ballot arguments in the initiative’s 
favor.26 Following this procedure, in 2008, State Senator Dennis 
21 E.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986); Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 
54, 65 (1986); Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 
592, 601 (1982).
22 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 154 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, United 
States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 906 (2016). See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497, 518 (2007) (explaining that states “are not normal litigants for the 
purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction”).
23 See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2664, 2668.
24 Twenty-six states allow voters to enact statutory or constitutional additions 
or changes by direct initiative (where voters bypass the legislature entirely, 
such as in California) or indirect initiative (where the legislature has a first 
opportunity to adopt the proposed initiative, but, if the legislature rejects it, 
then it goes to the voters). See Initiative and Referendum States, Nat’l Conf. 
of State Legis. (Dec. 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/chart-of-the-initiative-states.aspx.
25 E.g., Cal. Elec. Code §§ 9001, 9002, 9032 (Deering 2016).
26 See generally Cal. Elec. Code §§ 9001-9065 (Deering 2016). See also 
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662. The signature requirement is particularly 
onerous: a statutory initiative requires signatures numbering five percent 
of the total votes cast for all gubernatorial candidates in the most recent 
election, and a constitutional initiative requires eight percent. Cal. Const., 
art. II, § 8(b). In 2014, approximately 7.32 million votes were cast for all 
California gubernatorial candidates, meaning that slightly more than 585,000 
valid signatures now are required for a constitutional initiative and almost 
366,000 for a statutory initiative. See Statement of Vote, Cal. Sec’y of 
State 6 (Nov. 4, 2014), http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2014-general/
pdf/2014-complete-sov.pdf (the California Secretary of State’s “Statement of 
Vote” for the November 4, 2014 general election, which is California’s most 
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Hollingsworth — acting as a private citizen — and four other private 
citizens proposed a California constitutional initiative to bar legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage.27 Known as Proposition 8, the 
measure was approved by California’s voters in 2008.28
In 2009, two same-sex couples challenged Proposition 8’s 
constitutionality in the United States District Court.29 However, 
neither California’s Governor nor Attorney General actively 
defended Proposition 8.30 Thereafter, Senator Hollingsworth and 
the other official proponents successfully intervened as defendants 
in the District Court.31 After trial, in which the proponents actively 
participated, the District Court ruled Proposition 8 unconstitutional 
on due process and equal protection grounds.32
Neither the Governor nor Attorney General appealed the 
District Court’s judgment, but Proposition 8’s official proponents 
did. When the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals questioned whether 
the official proponents had standing to appeal, the proponents 
responded that they had an individualized interest in defending 
Proposition 8 and had “an alternative and independent additional 
basis for standing,” namely, the ability to assert the State’s interest 
in defending Proposition 8.33 The Ninth Circuit then certified the 
standing question to the California Supreme Court: Under California 
law, do official proponents “possess either [1] a particularized interest 
in the initiative’s validity or [2] the authority to assert the State’s 
interest in the initiative’s validity . . . ?”34 For ease of reference, this 
Article refers to “prong 1” of this inquiry as whether the proponent 
recent gubernatorial election). With signature gatherers charging $3 to $5 or 
more per signature, millions of dollars are typically required just to gather 
signatures. See, e.g., John S. Caragozian, From Crisis to Solution—California’s 
Problems in Two Books: A Review of Remaking California and California Crackup, 
44 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 687, 695 & nn.50-51 (2011); Petition People Gather Big 
Bucks, L.A. Times, Aug. 10, 2016, at B1, col. 1.
27 For a more detailed account of the passage of Proposition 8 and the litigation 
that followed, see Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1077-88.
28 See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2659.
29 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010); see also Complaint 
for Declaratory, Injunctive, or Other Relief, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. 
Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-2292), https://ecf.cand.uscourts.gov/
cand/09cv2292/files/1-1.pdf.
30 Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 995-1003.
33 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 628 F.3d 1191, 1196 (9th Cir. 2011).
34 Id. at 1193.
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has standing on his or her own personal behalf and “prong 2” as 
whether the proponent may assume the State’s standing. 
The California Supreme Court unanimously answered “yes” 
to the Ninth Circuit’s prong 2, accepting the proponents’ assertion 
of a representative interest, but expressly declined to answer prong 
1 regarding personal standing.35 The Ninth Circuit accepted the 
California Supreme Court’s answer and accordingly held that the 
official proponents had standing to represent the State in defending 
Proposition 8.36 On the merits, however, the Ninth Circuit affirmed 
the District Court’s judgment of Proposition 8’s unconstitutionality.37
The official proponents then appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court, where a five-to-four majority ruled that the 
official proponents lacked standing.38 The Court first held that 
the proponents lacked personal standing — prong 1 of the Ninth 
Circuit’s certified question to the California Supreme Court on 
which the California Supreme Court declined to rule.39 According to 
the Hollingsworth majority, once voters approved the initiative, the 
official proponents lost any unique role in the process.40 Instead, the 
proponents had only a general interest in the initiative, an interest 
shared by all other state citizens.41 This generalized interest, in turn, 
was insufficient to confer personal standing on the proponents.42
As for the Ninth Circuit’s prong 2 — where the California 
Supreme Court had answered that the official proponents possessed 
standing to assert the State’s interest43 — the Hollingsworth majority 
rejected the California Supreme Court’s opinion, concluding instead 
that the proponents were not proper agents of the State.44 As a 
threshold matter, Hollingsworth noted that the proponents were not 
elected officials.45 Moreover, the proponents lacked “the most basic 
35 Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1015, 1033 (Cal. 2011).
36 Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1072-73 (9th Cir. 2012), vacated and remanded 
sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
37 671 F.3d at 1064.
38 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2668.
39 Id. at 2662-63.
40 Id. at 2663.
41 Id.
42 Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (stating that after voters 
approve an initiative, the proponents “have no role” in its enforcement and, 
apparently, are nothing more than “concerned bystanders,” despite their being 
“deeply committed” or “zealous”).
43 Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1033 (Cal. 2011).
44 Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667.
45 Id. at 2668 (“We have never before upheld the standing of a private party to 
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features of an agency relationship.”46 For example, the proponents 
had no fiduciary obligations to the State and were not subject to 
the State’s control.47 Further, the majority opinion criticized a 
policy of granting proponents standing to represent a state, noting 
that proponents would be “free to pursue a purely ideological 
commitment to the [initiative’s] constitutionality without the 
need to take cognizance of resource constraints, changes in public 
opinion, or potential ramifications for other state priorities.”48 Given 
the absence of Hollingsworth appellants — the official proponents 
lacked standing and the State officials (who had standing) refused 
to appeal49 — the Court held that no “case or controversy” existed 
under Article III.50 Accordingly, the Court found a lack of jurisdiction 
and ordered that the Ninth Circuit vacate its judgment and dismiss 
the appeal, finalizing the District Court’s judgment of Proposition 
8’s unconstitutionality.51
Therefore, Hollingsworth holds that, under Article III, official 
proponents generally lack standing to defend “their” approved 
initiatives.52 More particularly, proponents qua proponents have 
defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state officials have chosen 
not to. We decline to do so for the first time here.”). See also id. at 2666-67.
46 Id. at 2666.
47 Id. at 2666-67.
48 Id. at 2667.
49 Id. at 2660, 2666-67.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 2668. In 2015 — two years after Hollingsworth — the Supreme Court 
reached the merits of same-sex marriage bans, holding them unconstitutional. 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
52 This general rule is subject to some exceptions. For example, in federal court:
A. Initiative proponents probably have standing to defend their initiatives 
from challenges before the initiatives are approved by voters. See, e.g., 
Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2662-63 (ruling that proponents lost their 
special role “once Proposition 8 was approved by the voters”).
B. In the Ninth Circuit, parties without standing (presumably including 
initiative proponents) may have “piggyback” standing: they may 
intervene as defendants if parties with standing (such as state officials) 
are also defending the lawsuit. See, e.g., State of Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 
v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 845-46 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2003). However, 
other circuits — including the D. C., Seventh, and Eighth Circuits — 
disallow such piggyback standing. See Peter A. Appel, Intervention in 
Public Law Litigation: The Environmental Paradigm, 78 Wash. U.L.Q. 215, 
270 (2000).
C. Again, in the Ninth Circuit, initiative proponents may defend 
their initiative during an appeal if they are appellees (though not as 
appellants). See, e.g., Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566, 573 
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neither personal standing (prong 1) nor a right to represent the State 
(prong 2). This lack of standing, in turn, may well be dispositive in 
suits challenging popular initiatives when the state itself refuses to 
defend. After all, under our adversary system, courts are more likely 
to invalidate an undefended initiative.
C.  Hollingsworth’s Aftermath
Various scholars and others have criticized Hollingsworth for 
giving state officials a practical veto over voter-approved initiatives.53 
Without a defense, Proposition 8 was — and, critics fear, other state 
initiatives will be — invalidated by federal courts.54
Attempts by recent initiative proponents to avoid Hollingsworth 
involve drafting initiative language appointing themselves “as agents 
of the people and the State” with authority to defend the initiative 
“in any legal proceeding.”55 This attempt to obtain representational 
standing is likely to fail for at least two reasons. First, under the 
California Constitution, “no statute proposed to the electors . . . 
by initiative, that names any individual to hold any office . . . may 
(9th Cir. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 465-66 (9th Cir. 2014).
D. With regard to some initiatives, proponents who would benefit from 
them — say, by lowered taxes — would have personal standing to 
defend such initiatives at trial and on appeal, though without reference 
to their status as proponents. See generally Manheim et al., supra note 15, 
at 1121-22, 1125-27 & n.286.
  Likewise, in state court, depending on state law, proponents may have 
authority to represent the state, thereby having standing to defend their 
initiatives at trial and on appeal. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (“Nor do 
we question . . . the right of initiative proponents to defend their initiatives in 
California courts, where Article III does not apply.”); Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 
1002, 1016-20 (Cal. 2001). See also Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1121.
53 See, e.g., Scott L. Kafker & David A. Russcol, Standing at a Constitutional Divide: 
Redefining State and Federal Requirements for Initiatives after Hollingsworth v. 
Perry, 71 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 229, 280-83 (2014); Manheim et al., supra 
note 15, at 1072 & n.3, 1120-21.
54 See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 53, at 242-43.
55 See Jamie Court, Request for Title and Summary for Proposed Online Privacy Act, No. 
14-0007, Initiative Coordinator, Cal. Att’y Gen. Office §§ 5(a), 
5(b)(1) (Jan. 16, 2014), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/14-
0007%20%2814-0007%20%28Online%20Privacy%20V2%29%29.pdf?. 
Implicit in such efforts is the proposition — also implicit in Hollingsworth —
that a defendant must have proper standing in order to appear as a formal 
party in a legal proceeding. The Court has indicated this principle expressly 
elsewhere. See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 217 (2011); Camreta v. 
Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 701 (2011). See generally, Hall, supra note 9.
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be submitted to the electors or have any effect.”56 Second, under 
federal law, a bare designation of an initiative’s proponent as a 
state’s agent — without fiduciary obligations and without the policy 
responsibilities of resource constraints and other state priorities — 
is unlikely to satisfy Hollingsworth.57
Other recent initiatives specify that special counsel must be 
appointed to defend the initiative.58 This solution probably passes 
Hollingsworth muster.59 Still, some proponents may resist it, because 
the special counsel — and not the proponents — would control the 
initiative’s defense.
II. Seeking to Avoid Hollingsworth: Embedding Standing in the 
Initiative Itself
The solutions discussed above in Part I-C — the rights of 
proponents or special counsel to represent the state and thus acquire 
the state’s standing to defend its own laws — are based on prong 2 
of the Ninth Circuit’s and Supreme Court’s decisions. A different 
approach, namely an attempt to create personal standing under 
prong 1, was illustrated by Proposition 60, the statutory initiative, 
which appeared — but did not pass — on the November 8, 2016, 
California ballot.60 While Proposition 60 was a California initiative, 
the standing issues that it exemplifies apply broadly to all states with 
initiatives.61 Furthermore, as discussed in Part II-B below, scholars 
have suggested variations on Proposition 60’s penalty, and those 
56 Cal. Const. art. II, § 12. Other states have this same prohibition. See note 
115 infra. The prohibition is further discussed at notes 114-17 infra and 
accompanying text. 
57 See Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1141.
58 See, e.g., High Quality Teachers Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 13-0062, § 14(a) 
(Cal. 2013), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/13-0062%20
(13-0062%20(Teachers%20V2)).pdf; No Blank Checks Initiative, Pub. L. No. 
14-0009 (Cal. 2014), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/14-
0009%20(14-0009%20(Bond-funded%20Projects)).pdf. See also Manheim et 
al., supra note 15, at 1140.
59 In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988), the Supreme Court upheld the 
right of special prosecutors to represent the United States. The Hollingsworth 
Court reaffirmed Morrison’s holding. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 
2652, 2665 (2013). For additional analysis and detail (including proposed 
model language) regarding the appointment of special counsel to defend 
initiatives, see Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1137-38, 1140.
60 Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 7. 
61 Id.
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variations also apply beyond California.
Proposition 60 — to regulate the adult film industry in 
California — was proposed by a single individual and received the 
requisite number of signatures to qualify for the statewide ballot.62 
Proposition 60 included two provisions relevant to this new standing 
approach:
Section 7. Proponent Accountability. 
 The People of the State of California hereby 
declare that the proponent of [Proposition 60] 
should be held civilly liable in the event [Proposition 
60] is struck down, after passage, by a court for 
being constitutionally or statutorily impermissible. 
Such a[n] . . . impermissible initiative is a misuse 
of taxpayer funds and electoral resources and 
[Proposition 60]’s proponent, as the drafter . . . must 
be held accountable . . . .
 In the event [Proposition 60], after 
passage, is struck down . . . in whole or in part, as 
unconstitutional or statutorily invalid, and all avenues 
for appealing and overturning the court decision 
have been exhausted, the proponent shall pay a civil 
penalty of $10,000 to the . . . State of California for 
failure to draft a wholly constitutionally or statutorily 
permissible initiative . . . . No party of entity may 
waive this civil penalty.63
. . . . 
Section 9. Severability. 
 If any provision of [Proposition 60], or part 
thereof, . . . is for any reason held to be invalid or 
unconstitutional, the remaining provisions and parts 
62 Michael Weinstein, Request for Title and Summary for Proposed California Safer 
Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act, No. 15-0004, Initiative Coordinator, 
Cal. Att’y Gen. Office (Feb. 12, 2015), https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/
initiatives/pdfs/15-0004%20%28Safer%20Sex%29_8.pdf?.
63 Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 7.
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shall not be affected, but shall remain in full force 
and effect, and to this end the provisions and parts 
of [Proposition 60] are severable. The voters hereby 
declare that [Proposition 60], and each portion and 
part, would have been adopted irrespective of whether 
any one or more provisions or parts are found to be 
invalid or unconstitutional.64
Proposition 60’s Section 10 also dealt with standing, but 
unlike Section 7, it was designed to achieve standing via prong 2.65 
Section 10 would appoint the proponent as a state employee if “the 
Attorney General fails to defend [Proposition 60] . . . or fails to appeal 
an adverse judgment . . . .”66 Upon the proponent’s appointment, he 
would be: removable only for “good cause” as voted by “each house 
of the Legislature”; required to take same the oath of office that all 
state employees take, subject to “all fiduciary . . . duties prescribed 
by law”; and allowed to defend Proposition 60.67 The state would be 
required to pay for the proponent’s “reasonable expenses and other 
losses incurred . . . in defending . . . [Proposition 60].”68 Under 
Section 10, and upon the Attorney General’s failure to defend, the 
proponent would become a salaried state employee and would be 
entitled to engage outside counsel — at the State’s expense — to 
appear on behalf of the State in defending the initiative.69
64 Id. § 9.
65 Id. § 10.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Proposition 60’s proponent had reason to apprehend that California officials 
might refuse to defend Proposition 60. The same proponent proposed a similar 
initiative to regulate the adult film industry in Los Angeles County. That 
initiative, titled Measure B, was approved by Los Angeles County’s voters in 
2012, but no county officials actively defended it when its constitutionality 
was challenged in federal court. Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 
1113, 1121-22 (C.D. Cal. 2013), aff ’d, 774 F.3d 566, 573 (9th Cir. 2014). See also 
Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1123-27 & nn.281, 286 & 299-300. Instead, 
the county officials filed an answer that the complaint “presents important 
constitutional questions that require and warrant judicial determination,” 
but the officials otherwise took “a position of neutrality regarding whether 
Measure B is constitutional . . . .” Vivid Entm’t. v Fielding, No. 13-00190, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54060, at *12 & n.1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2013). See also 
Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1123 & n.281.
69 Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 10.
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A. Creating an Individual Stake in the Validity of Proposition 
60: Injury in the Form of Penalty
Proposition 60’s Section 7 raises a fundamental question of 
standing to defend initiatives: Does a prospective penalty of this nature 
give the proponent a concrete interest in the initiative sufficient to 
confer standing to defend it? The answer is far from certain.
In the event that an initiative with this language were 
approved by voters and challenged in court, the proponent would 
argue that he has a concrete interest in defending it because he 
personally faces a monetary penalty if the initiative is invalidated. 
This interest is not a general one shared by other state citizens. 
Accordingly, the proponent, as an individual, also has prong 1’s 
particularized standing.
A plaintiff challenging the initiative might object to the 
proponent’s prong 1 standing argument on at least three independent 
grounds. First, the proponent would not have the fiduciary 
obligations and would not meet the policy criteria — such as the 
resource constraints with which state officials contend — required 
by Hollingsworth. Second, the prospect of the monetary penalty may 
be insufficiently concrete to serve as a basis for standing. Third, even 
if the penalty is concrete, a court might conclude that, as a self-
inflicted injury, it cannot serve as a basis for standing. Each of these 
objections is discussed below.
1. Absence of Fiduciary Obligations
One of Hollingsworth’s rationales for denying standing to 
initiative proponents was that proponents lack fiduciary obligations 
and therefore — unlike state officials — need not account for a 
state’s resource constraints, changes in public opinion, or potential 
ramifications for other state priorities.70 This rationale, in turn, 
might be used by a plaintiff to object to a proponent’s standing, 
because the monetary penalty does not imbue the proponent with 
a state official’s fiduciary obligations or a state official’s resource 
constraints and other policy considerations.
On the other hand, Hollingsworth’s policy rationale here was 
aimed at prong 2: whether a proponent could represent the state 
and thereby assume the state’s standing. An individual’s standing 
70 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct 2652, 2666-67 (2013).
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under prong 1 — the personal standing created arguendo by the 
monetary penalty — would presumably be unaffected by such policy 
considerations. After all, a litigant with his or her own “particularized” 
injury would seem, by definition, not to need the fiduciary or policy 
obligations of a state. Accordingly, an objection based on a proponent’s 
lack of fiduciary duty and attendant lack of policy constraints appears 
to be inapposite to prong 1’s personal standing.
2. Lack of Concrete Injury
As discussed earlier,71 the injury in fact must be not only 
particularized to the party claiming standing (which it is here), but 
also concrete. A concrete injury may be “threatened” and still be 
sufficient, but the injury cannot be “abstract.”72 In assessing how 
“real” the “risk” of concrete injury must be, the Supreme Court 
has looked to tort law, specifically the Restatement of Torts, for 
principles governing what damages may and may not be recovered by 
tort victims.73 In other words, whether damages are real enough for 
purposes of Article III standing may relate to whether such damages 
are recoverable under tort law.
Unfortunately, but unsurprisingly, the Restatement’s text 
provides only the most general guidance here. For example, with 
regard to the “certainty” of damages, a tort victim must “establish[] 
by proof the . . . adequate compensation with as much certainty 
as the nature of the tort and the circumstances permit.”74 The 
Restatement’s comments are no more helpful. The victim must 
prove damages “with reasonable certainty” but, with regard to future 
harm, “[t]here is no mathematical formula that will determine the 
chance of the harm occurring . . . .”75
While the $10,000 penalty incurred under Proposition 60 
might appear on the surface to pose a real threat, Section 7’s actual 
language creates uncertainty in at least three separate ways. First, if 
the entire initiative were invalidated, then the proponent would not 
be penalized, because the only basis for the penalty was a provision in 
the now-defunct initiative. On the other hand, if — as contemplated 
71 See supra notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
72 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
73 See, e.g., id. at 1549; Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 625 (2004); Metro-N. 
Commuter R. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 439-41 (1997).
74 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 912 (Am. L. Inst. 1979).
75 Id. at cmts. a & e.
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under Section 7 — a court invalidates only part of the initiative, it 
is unclear whether the monetary penalty would survive the arguendo 
invalidity of some or all of the rest of the initiative. To be sure, 
Proposition 60’s Section 9 contains standard boilerplate that all of 
the initiative’s provisions are severable.76 However, depending on 
each initiative’s particular circumstances (including its language and 
what parts are or are not valid), a court may disregard an initiative’s 
severability language77 and strike down the entire initiative, including 
its otherwise valid parts.78 The likelihood of the prospective penalty’s 
survival, in turn, affects whether the penalty is sufficiently concrete 
to support the proponent’s standing.
Severability, like damage certainty, is an inexact concept, not 
capable of precise application.79 In general, federal courts look to 
state law regarding initiatives’ severability.80 Under California law, a 
severability clause such as Proposition 60’s Section 9, “[a]lthough 
not conclusive,” provides some support for severability.81 Among the 
criteria for severability, courts look to “volitional” severability, which 
is whether an initiative’s remaining provisions (i.e., those provisions 
not determined to be invalid) are “substantive” and “would likely 
have been adopted by the people had they foreseen the invalidity 
76 See Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 9.
77 See Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal Statutes, 46 Stan. l. 
rev. 235, 291 (1994) (noting that in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), 
Court treated severability clause under consideration as “raising only a 
presumption of severability” (citing Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932, 934)); David 
H. Gans, Severability as Judicial Lawmaking, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 639, 652 
(2008) (discussing discretion exercised by Supreme Court to treat statutes’ 
provisions as nonseverable).
78 See, e.g., Mulkey v. Reitman, 413 P.2d 825, 835-36 (Cal. 1966), aff ’d sub 
nom. 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (holding an initiative’s severability clause to be 
“ineffective,” because the unconstitutional provisions were “fully integrated 
and . . . not severable” (citation omitted)); Ex parte Blaney, 184 P.2d 892, 
900-01 (Cal. 1947) (refusing to use authority under a statute’s severability 
clause, because the statute failed “to differentiate” between protected and 
unprotected speech).
79 See Robert L. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 
Harv. L. Rev. 76, 110-11 (1937) (“[T]he Court is free to decide each case 
[involving severability] the way it pleases without having its discretion fettered 
by any restraining doctrine.”); Kevin C. Walsh, Partial Unconstitutionality, 85 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 738, 749, 777 (2010) (describing severability doctrine as 
“destructive and manipulable”).
80 E.g., Nat’l Broiler Council v. Voss, 44 F.3d 740, 748 n.12 (9th Cir. 1994).
81 Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1256 (Cal. 1989) (quoting 
Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal.3d 315, 331 (1975); 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 32 Cal.3d 180, 190 (1982)).
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of the [challenged provision] . . . .”82 It appears, therefore, that a 
severable and otherwise valid non-substantive provision — such as 
a monetary penalty on the proponent — might not survive if all of 
the initiative’s substantive provisions are invalidated.83
A court’s determination of severability becomes more 
difficult when severability bears on standing. Typically, a court 
decides severability after trial, when rendering judgment on the 
initiative’s validity. For example, initiative sections x and y are 
adjudged to be invalid, but initiative section z is valid and is (or is 
not) severable.84 However, this timing is disrupted when the court 
must assess severability to determine standing, because standing 
is a “threshold question”85 which is to be determined as early as 
the pleading stage.86 A court, then, in order to determine whether 
the penalty is “real” enough to constitute a sufficiently concrete 
injury, would preliminarily assess the initiative’s likely validity 
and the monetary penalty’s likely severability before trial.87 Thus, 
82 See Calfarm Ins., 771 P.2d. at 1256 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); Gerken v. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, 863 P.2d 694, 716 (Cal. 
1994). See also League of Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 766-
67 (C.D. Cal. 1995). 
83 While federal courts look to state law regarding severability, federal courts also 
should avoid nullifying an entire statute in the absence of a clear legislative 
intent to withdraw the valid portions of a statute if the challenged provision is 
struck down. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 506 & n.15 
(1985).
84 See, e.g., Calfarm Ins., 771 P.2d at 1255-56.
85 Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 616 (1973).
86 National Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1994). 
See also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (“Where . . . 
a case is at the pleading stage, the plaintiff must ‘clearly . . . allege facts 
demonstrating’ each element [of standing].” (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 
U.S. 490, 518 (1975))).
87 With specific regard to Proposition 60, its proponent could be confident 
that some of Proposition 60’s substantive provisions would have survived 
constitutional challenge. The same proponent previously proposed Measure 
B, which was a similar adult-film initiative passed by Los Angeles County 
voters in 2012. See sources cited supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
Measure B had a condom requirement and other provisions which were 
challenged by plaintiff adult film producers and actors on free speech and due 
process grounds. Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1132-34 
(C.D. Cal. 2013). When plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the 
condom requirement’s enforcement, the Ninth Circuit upheld the condom 
requirement’s constitutionality (at least at the preliminary injunction stage). 
Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2014). The same 
condom requirement, in turn, was copied word for word into Proposition 60. 
See Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 4. Accordingly, Proposition 60’s condom 
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the severability of any of an initiative’s provisions depends on the 
language and circumstances of that particular initiative. Whether 
the proponent would be able to bear his or her burden of proving 
standing based on a prospective monetary penalty will vary from 
initiative to initiative. 
Second, even if a monetary penalty survived because it is 
severable from other provisions’ arguendo invalidity, Proposition 60’s 
penalty would be imposed only after “all avenues for appealing and 
overturning the court decision have been exhausted.”88 What does it 
mean that all avenues for “overturning” — as distinguished from 
“appealing” — the court decision have been exhausted? For example, 
if a court invalidated an initiative in such a way that further legislation 
could cure its (the initiative’s) defects, would the introduction 
of such legislation mean that proponents have yet to exhaust “all 
avenues,” thereby keeping any penalty in abeyance? Likewise, would 
an additional initiative proposed to cure the invalidity keep a penalty 
in abeyance? Without answers to such questions, a proponent might 
be unable to bear his or her burden of proving that such a prospective 
penalty is sufficiently real.
Third, a monetary penalty along the lines of Proposition 60’s 
Section 7 might have been deemed a bill of attainder in violation 
of the Constitution.89 Bills of attainder are “legislative acts, no 
matter what their form, that apply either to named individuals or to 
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict 
punishment on them without a judicial trial.”90 Put another way, the 
Constitution provides “a general safeguard against legislative exercise 
of the judicial function, or more simply—trial by legislature.”91 The 
specific argument here is that the monetary penalty does not apply to 
all initiatives’ proponents; rather, it only imposes a $10,000 fine on 
requirement would probably have survived a challenge, too. With one of 
Proposition 60’s substantive provisions likely to have been valid, Proposition 
60’s Section 7 fine would have been likely severable from any invalid provisions. 
However, the severability issue discussed here is not limited to Proposition 
60. In the future, other initiatives may lack the close precedent exemplified by 
Measure B, so the survival of future initiatives’ substantive provisions — and 
the resulting severability of a fine — would be an open question.
88 Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 7 (emphasis added).
89 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
90 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
91 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442 (1965). See also Cummings v. 
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 320 (1867) (acknowledging that punishment 
for purposes of bill of attainder can be civil as well as criminal sanction).
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this one individual proponent and, accordingly, is unconstitutional. 
Once again, the fine’s uncertainty, this time based on concerns that it 
is a bill of attainder, raises the question: Is the threatened injury — the 
only basis for the proponent’s individual standing — adequately real?
In light of the above uncertainties, whether singly or in 
combination, might the Supreme Court or other federal courts 
nonetheless accept an initiative’s Proposition 60-type penalty as a 
sufficiently concrete basis for a proponent’s individual standing? On 
the one hand, a federal court would have to evaluate all of these 
uncertainties at a lawsuit’s beginning — when a proponent first seeks 
to appear — and Hollingsworth’s hostility to initiative proponents’ 
standing might auger that proponents have not met their burden. 
On the other hand, proponents might argue that the Court’s citation 
to tort damages suggests a low level of proof, because “[c]ourts 
have traditionally required greater certainty in the proof of damages 
for breach of a contract than in the proof of damages for a tort.”92 
Oddsmakers might set the line here at “pick ‘em.”
3. The Bar Against Self-Inflicted Injury
The Supreme Court has long held that a party cannot base 
a claim to standing on a self-inflicted injury.93 Accordingly, a party 
objecting to an initiative proponent’s standing here could argue that 
the proponent manufactured his own injury. The proponent himself 
or herself drafted the threat of a monetary penalty and then further 
gathered signatures, approved ballot arguments, and undertook 
such other legal and political actions as were necessary to obtain 
the initiative’s passage. The proponent might respond that the 
voters who approved the initiative enacted the penalty and not the 
proponent (who lacked power to enact anything). The proponent 
92 Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §352, cmt. a (Am. L. Inst. 
1981).
93 For example, in Pennsylvania v. New Jersey, 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam), 
various states, including Pennsylvania, complained about other states’ tax 
policies, because those policies, in combination with the complaining states’ 
tax credits, reduced the complaining states’ tax revenues. The Court held 
that Pennsylvania and the other complaining States lacked standing, because 
“nothing prevents Pennsylvania from withdrawing that [tax] credit . . . . No 
State can be heard to complain about damage inflicted by its own hand.” Id. 
at 664. See also Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. at 1152-53 (finding 
that parties’ “self-inflicted injuries are not fairly traceable to the [defendant]’s 
purported activities” and therefore do not create standing).
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might add that, as a corollary, he or she cannot unilaterally undo — 
and cannot avoid — the already-enacted penalty. To counter such 
reasoning, a party objecting to the proponent’s standing might then 
reply that, but for the proponent’s drafting and other pro-initiative 
activities, no voter approval would have occurred and no penalty 
would exist. 
There does not appear to be direct precedent shedding light 
on whether a self-inflicted-injury objection defeats an initiative 
proponent’s standing. Still, Clapper v. Amnesty International USA94 is 
instructive on the Court’s expansive conception of what qualifies as 
a self-inflicted injury negating standing. There, the Court rejected 
a facial challenge to a law95 that allowed the Attorney General and 
the Director of National Intelligence to authorize the surveillance of 
noncitizens thought to be located outside the United States.96 Among 
the plaintiffs were attorneys and human rights organizations asserting 
that their work involved communications with probable targets of 
surveillance under the law.97 They argued that risk of surveillance had 
forced them to take “costly and burdensome measures” to keep their 
communications confidential.98 In the Court’s eyes, however, the 
plaintiffs sought to “manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm 
on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm.”99 
It hardly seems likely that the plaintiffs in Clapper went to 
the cost and trouble of shielding their communications from federal 
surveillance simply to create the opportunity to gain access to court. 
By contrast, Proposition 60’s proponent obviously inserted the 
monetary penalty into the initiative for the very purpose of securing a 
place in court. Applying Clapper’s approach, a court could well ignore 
the technical niceties of who enacted the initiative and hold the 
proponent responsible for bringing the harm on himself or herself.
Additionally, whatever the merits of competing arguments 
over whether an initiative’s penalty provision creates Article III 
standing, a broader consideration may prevent creation of standing 
through this means. For over four decades, the Court has taken a 
notably restrictive approach to standing.100 Rigorous enforcement of 
94 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138.
95 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012).
96 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1142-43.
97 Id. at 1145.
98 Id.at 1146.
99 Id. at 1151.
100 See, e.g., Clapper, 133 S. Ct. 1138; Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 
U.S. 1, 11 (2004); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Allen 
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standing requirements is rooted largely in the Court’s commitment to 
observing the “properly limited . . . role of the courts in a democratic 
society.”101 In light of this philosophy, it seems unlikely that the 
Court would countenance devices to circumvent Hollingsworth by 
empowering proponents to draft their own Article III injuries. 
Perhaps the circumstances of Hollingsworth are sufficiently infrequent 
that recognizing an injury constructed this way would not open 
floodgates to federal litigation on initiatives. Still, it would encourage 
an increase of the occasions on which federal courts assess initiatives 
that runs counter to a central aim of modern standing doctrine. 
Moreover, if accepted, the rationale for standing through this means 
could open the door to mechanisms with potential to widen the range 
of individuals with personal standing to defend initiatives.
B. Variations on Creation of Standing via a Penalty
Scholars Scott Kafker and David Russcol propose two 
variations on Proposition 60’s penalty,102 both intended to create 
prong 1’s personal standing.
1. Variation 1: Bounty
Whether by general state law or as embedded in an initiative, 
a successful defense of the initiative would entitle the defender to 
a monetary bounty.103 While this bounty proposal might avoid the 
uncertainty and self-inflicted injury concerns of the penalty discussed 
above, we doubt whether such a bounty would pass Hollingsworth 
muster. In principle, such a bounty lacks any limits on who could 
claim standing. For example, an initiative could offer a bounty to 
any persons — not just proponents — who successfully defend the 
initiative. Indeed, a bounty could be attached to any law, whether 
federal or state and whether traditional legislation or initiative, 
thereby giving everyone prong 1 personal standing to defend an 
initiative’s or other law’s validity. 
v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 
166 (1974).
101 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
102 See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 53, at 291-95. This variation is the obverse 
of Proposition 60: In the latter, the proponent is penalized for failing to 
successfully defend his or her initiative; in the former, the proponent is 
rewarded for successfully defending his or her initiative. 
103 See id. at 291-92.
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To be sure, as Kafker and Russcol have noted, a bounty may bear 
some resemblance to a traditional qui tam action, which does confer 
standing on the relator (akin to a plaintiff).104 However, an essential 
element of a qui tam action is that the government and relator share in 
a monetary recovery: The relator receives “a partial assignment of the 
Government’s damages claim.”105 In other words, the government 
and relator share in a monetary recovery,106 an element which the 
bounty lacks. Accordingly, the Supreme Court, with its inhospitality 
to initiative proponents’ standing, would be unlikely to countenance 
bounty-based standing given its limitless applicability and its failure 
to adhere to traditional qui tam requirements.
2. Variation 2: Refundable Filing Fee
Some states, as a matter of existing law, may require all 
initiative proponents to pay a fee upon the filing of the initiative.107 
Under Kafker and Russcol’s variation 2, this filing fee would be 
wholly or partially refunded to the proponent upon a successful 
defense of the initiative.108
An initiative’s refund provision, depending on its exact 
wording, might or might not avoid Proposition 60’s uncertainty 
problems. The refund would avoid Proposition 60’s self-inflicted 
injury problem, because the original fee is required of any proponent 
who files a proposed initiative. The refund also avoids the overbreadth 
of variation 1, in that variation 2’s refund would be available only to 
104 See id. Qui tam is a statutory creation, derived from old English law: Under 
specified statutes and circumstances, a private party — who has suffered no 
injury — may sue a wrongdoer to recover a penalty owed to the government, 
with the recovery divided between the private party and the government. See, 
e.g., Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 
768-72 & nn.1&3 (2000).
105 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2665 (2013).
106 E.g., Black’s Law Dictionary 1414 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
107 See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. § 23-17-21 (West 2017); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-
24-302 (West 2016).
108 See Kafker & Russcol, supra note 53, at 292-95. Of course, this variation 2 would 
be unavailable in those states which lack a filing fee for initiatives, because 
nothing could be refunded. For example, California requires a $2,000 filing 
fee, but the fee is refunded if the initiative “qualifies for the ballot within two 
years . . . .” Cal. Elec. Code § 9001(c) (West 2016). Accordingly, no refund 
would be available in California, because, by definition, the fee would have been 
refunded before the enacted initiative’s validity is tested. Without the possibility 
of a refund, in turn, variation 2 could not create standing in California.
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the proponents who paid the original fee, and the refund could not 
be claimed by just any self-selected defender of the initiative. With 
these defects avoided, initiative proponents could argue that the 
refund gives them individual standing: a personal monetary stake 
which is contingent upon the initiative’s validity. 
On the other hand, a refund presents a logical tangle. More 
particularly, this variation 2 might run afoul of the Supreme Court’s 
hostility toward “manufacture[d] standing.”109 The proponent’s 
original “injury in fact” is the filing fee.110 However, this injury is 
“not fairly traceable to [the challenged law].”111 Indeed, the injury 
and the refund are unconnected, save for the language in which the 
proponent himself or herself inserted into the initiative.112
C. Representational Standing Through State Employment
As earlier discussed, Proposition 60’s Section 10 sought 
to gain standing through the separate route of conferring prong 
2’s representational status on the proponent in the event that the 
Attorney General fails to defend the initiative.113 Such a provision 
raises the question of whether an initiative can delegate the state’s 
standing to a proponent by appointing him or her as a state official. 
Here, the answer appears to be clearer than with regard to prong 
1’s personal standing: “No.” Three independent reasons undermine 
Section 10 and, more generally, other proposed prong 2 language.
First, Section 10 would likely run afoul of California’s 
constitution, which bars a proposed initiative from naming “any 
individual to hold any office”114 — perhaps a violation as well under 
comparable provisions in the constitutions of other states authorizing 
initiatives.115 Here, the proponent would become a state employee 
109 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1151 (2013).
110 Cf. Wittman v. Personhuballah, 136 S. Ct. 1732, 1736 (2016) (requiring 
evidence of the injury in fact).
111 Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1151.
112 It is true that the Court has recognized standing for a qui tam relator under 
an assignor-assignee rationale. Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. 
Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773-74 (2000). Still, the circumstances there — where 
the government enlisted private support to recover from a concrete monetary 
injury that it has suffered — seem well removed from a scheme crafted for 
the sole purpose of slipping the plaintiff into court rather than to redress a 
monetary injury to the government. See id.
113 See supra notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
114 Cal. Const. art. II, § 12. See also discussion supra Part I-C.
115 See, e.g., Ariz. Const. art. IV pt. 2, § 19, cl. 13; Colo. Const. art. V, §25, cl. 8 
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if California’s Attorney General failed to defend Proposition 60. The 
contingency of the proponent’s status raises the question of whether 
such a conditional appointment violates the state constitution’s 
prohibition. It seems a fair reading of the California Constitution’s 
prohibition on naming an individual to office that it applies whether 
the naming is conditional or unconditional. If this argument were to 
prevail, the California Constitution would then subject the initiative 
to a pre-election challenge to prevent its “submi[ssion] to the 
electors.”116 Even if this California constitutional violation occurred 
only when the Attorney General failed to defend the initiative — 
that is, Proposition 60’s Section 10 condition precedent is met — 
and the proponent’s appointment becomes unconditional, plaintiffs 
could still successfully challenge the initiative.117 Proposition 60’s 
Section 10, then, appears to have been an impermissible naming of 
the proponent to office.
(barring as “[s]pecial legislation,” inter alia, laws “granting to any corporation, 
association or individual any special or exclusive privilege, immunity or 
franchise whatever”); N.J. Const. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 9, cl. 8 (same); Justin R. Long, 
State Constitutional Prohibitions on Special Laws, 60 Clev. St. L. Rev. 719, 721 
n.6 (2012) (collecting state constitutional prohibitions of “special” laws); see 
generally Anthony Schutz, State Constitutional Restrictions on Special Legislation as 
Structural Restraints, 40 J. Legis. 39 (2013-2014) (examining the widespread 
prohibitions on states’ abilities to enact “special laws,” including laws which 
identify particular persons).
116 Cal. Const. art. II, § 12.
117 See id. While the California Constitution’s language is that no such initiative 
“shall have any effect,” the California Supreme Court has ruled that an 
initiative provision which impermissibly names an individual to office might 
be severed, with the rest of the initiative remaining valid. See, e.g., Calfarm 
Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 771 P.2d 1247, 1263, 1266 (Cal. 1989) (an initiative’s 
identification of a “private corporation” to perform a “function” in violation of 
California Constitution, art. II, § 12 may be severed, such that the remainder 
of the initiative is valid). This severability option might not save a proposed 
initiative which is challenged under Cal. Const. art. II, § 12 (and other 
states’ similar provisions, see supra note 114) before the initiative is enacted 
by voters. While no case law on this question appears to exist, an initiative’s 
opponents could argue: (a) severability under Calfarm Ins. was in connection 
with an already “enacted” initiative, 771 P.2d at 1249, (b) an initiative’s 
severability language can have no legal effect if the initiative — including the 
severability language — has not been enacted, and (c) the plain language of 
Cal. Const. art. II, § 12 is that no initiative naming “any individual to hold 
any office . . . may be submitted to the electors . . . , ” and this pre-election 
remedy contains no provision for severability. In sum, language such as 
Proposition 60’s Section 10 might doom an entire initiative notwithstanding 
severability language — if the initiative is challenged before the election.
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Second, Proposition 60’s Section 10 appeared to conflict with 
Proposition 60’s Section 7. Section 10 would have subjected the 
proponent to “all fiduciary duties” prescribed by law, presumably 
including all such duties imposed on state employees. However, 
Section 7 posed the possibility of a $10,000 penalty on the proponent 
if any part of the initiative was invalidated by a court.118 In some 
instances, a state could benefit from conceding the invalidity of a 
specific provision: for example, to delete a possibly unconstitutional 
provision, so as to preserve the remainder of the initiative. Under 
ordinary circumstances, a state employee might have a fiduciary 
duty to so concede. However, the proponent would have a contrary 
personal interest in conceding nothing — that is, defending every 
single provision of the initiative — lest he or she personally be 
penalized $10,000.
Third, under federal law, even if the proponent were technically 
an agent of the state, he or she would not be a true public official 
entitled as a matter of policy to assume the state’s standing. As set 
forth in Hollingsworth, officials with standing on behalf of the state are 
subject to the state’s “resource constraints, changes in public opinion, 
or potential ramifications for other state priorities.”119 However, an 
initiative proponent — even if a state employee — is subject to none 
of these policy considerations. For example, Proposition 60’s Section 
10 expressly provided that the state must reimburse the proponent’s 
defense expenses, and Section 10 listed no exceptions, even in the 
face of, say, severe state budgetary constraints.120
These policy considerations grow larger and more complex 
if an initiative has more than one official proponent. For example, 
as noted earlier, California’s Proposition 8 had five proponents.121 
Depending on the initiative’s actual language, this multiplicity 
of proponents could raise vexing issues. Could each of the five 
proponents become a state employee? If so, would they have to 
agree on a single counsel, or would each be entitled to appear and 
engage different outside counsel to defend the initiative? If the 
former, what if the proponents could not agree on a single attorney? 
If the latter, the resulting expenses of multiple counsel could be 
substantial and without a finite cap. In addition, what would happen 
if the various proponents’ defenses conflicted? One proponent might 
118 Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 7.
119 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2667 (2013).
120 Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 10.
121 See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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interpret a provision in the initiative in a way inconsistent with 
another proponent’s interpretation. In a similar vein, one proponent 
might concede the invalidity of a provision, but another proponent 
might not. If an initiative had five (or more) official proponents, 
such conflicts might be likely. Would a court be obligated to accept 
all conflicting positions as representing the state? Thus, it seems 
improbable that a federal court would accord proponents standing 
to represent the state in defending initiatives, even if the proponent 
formally becomes a state employee.122
III. Seeking to Avoid Hollingsworth: Allowing Participation in 
Litigation Without the Need for Standing
Proposition 54, which will reform state legislative procedures 
by, inter alia, requiring that bills are posted on the Internet at least 
seventy-two hours before being passed, contains the following 
Section 6.1:
Section 12511.7 is added to the Government Code123 
to read:
. . . . 
 If an action is brought challenging, in whole or 
in part, the validity of [Proposition 54], the following 
shall apply:
 (a) The Legislature shall continue to 
comply with [Proposition 54] unless it is declared 
122 Apart from Proposition 60’s section 10 problems vis-à-vis standing, Section 
10 is also vague — or even defective — with regard to the meaning of the 
Attorney General’s failure to defend (which is the condition precedent to the 
proponent’s appointment as a State employee with authority to defend the 
initiative on the State’s behalf). What if the Attorney General appears to defend 
the initiative, but concedes the invalidity of critical parts of the initiative? Or 
the Attorney General appears, but his or her defense lacks “vigor”? See Perry 
v. Brown, 265 P. 3d 1002, 1022 (Cal. 2011). See also Manheim et al., supra note 
15, at 1085-86 & n.92 (opining that a defense lacking vigor may be worse than 
no defense at all, because the former is subtler than the latter and might allow 
the non-vigorous official to escape political accountability).
123 This new Section 12511.7 is added under California Government Code 
Chapter 6 (titled, “Attorney General”), Article 2 (titled, “General Powers and 
Duties”). Cal. Gov’t Code § 12511.7 (Deering 2016).
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unconstitutional pursuant to a final judgment of an 
appellate court.
 (b) Except as set forth in subdivision (c), 
the Attorney General shall defend against any action 
challenging, in whole or in part, the validity of 
[Proposition 54] . . . .
 (c) If the Attorney General declines to defend 
the validity of [Proposition 54] . . . , the Attorney 
General shall nonetheless file an appeal from, or seek 
review of, any judgment of any court that determines 
that [Proposition 54] is invalid, in whole or in part, 
if necessary or appropriate to preserve the state’s 
standing to defend [Proposition 54] in conformity 
with the Attorney General’s constitutional duty to see 
that the laws of the state are adequately enforced.124
The apparent theory of Proposition 54’s Section 6.1 is to 
allow the proponents (though without standing under Hollingsworth) 
to participate in federal litigation if Proposition 54 is challenged.125 
124 Proposition 54, supra note 6, § 6.1. Proposition 54 additionally provides that 
(i) its “official proponents . . . have an unconditional right to participate, 
either as interveners [sic] or real parties in interest” in any action regarding 
Proposition 54’s “validity or interpretation” and (ii) if the Governor and 
Attorney General decline to defend Proposition 54, then the proponents are 
“authorized to act on the state’s behalf in asserting the state’s interest in 
the validity of [Proposition 54] . . . .” Id. § 6.1(d). In federal courts, both of 
these additional provisions — i.e., giving the proponents a blanket right to 
participate or the right to act on behalf of the state — are directly barred by 
Hollingsworth. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (States cannot “simply . . . 
issu[e] to private parties who otherwise lack standing a ticket to the federal 
courthouse.”). See also supra notes 39-51 and accompanying text.
125 A federal court lawsuit over Proposition 54 appears entirely hypothetical, in 
that Proposition 54 presents no federal issues. Rather, only matters of the 
state’s constitution and statutes are at issue, and those issues would be 
litigated in state court, where proponents always have standing as a matter of 
state law. See Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2667 (“Nor do we question . . . the 
right of initiative proponents to defend their initiatives in California courts, 
where Article III does not apply.”); Perry v. Brown, 265 P.3d 1002, 1016-20 
(Cal. 2001). See also Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1121. However, because 
future initiatives that do present federal issues may contain Section 6.1-type 
provisions, Part III of this article will analyze whether such provisions would 
generally allow proponents to participate in federal court.
96 John S� Caragozian and Nat Stern
As long as the state appears as a party — even as an inactive party 
refusing to file a brief — and as long as Proposition 54 is enforced 
during the litigation’s pendency, an adverse proceeding may exist. 
This adverse proceeding, in turn, would allow an initiative’s 
proponents to defend the initiative, albeit as intervenors or amici 
without the requisite standing to be an actual defendant.
This theory might have been inspired, in part, by the United 
States Supreme Court’s holding in Windsor v. United States,126 decided 
on the same day as Hollingsworth. In Windsor, a surviving spouse of 
a same-sex couple challenged a provision of the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (“DOMA”) that denied her certain tax benefits.127 The 
United States Attorney General refused to defend the validity of the 
DOMA provision, but (a) continued to enforce it by refusing to issue 
a tax refund to the plaintiff surviving spouse and (b) filed a notice of 
appeal — though not a brief — after the trial court and court of appeals 
found it unconstitutional.128 At trial and on appeal, a congressional 
entity, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”), intervened 
and sought to defend the DOMA provision.129 The Supreme Court 
expressly declined to decide whether BLAG had standing, but it held 
that the case was justiciable because the United States continued 
to enforce the DOMA provision and would suffer a real injury upon 
refunding the tax payment to the plaintiff.130
Proposition 54 appears to track Windsor in that its Section 
6.1 obligates the legislature to continue to adhere to Proposition 
54’s procedural mandates until a judgment of its invalidity becomes 
final and obligates the California Attorney General to file a notice 
of appeal, even if he or she does not otherwise defend Proposition 
54.131 Thus, in theory, Windsor-type justiciability is established, 
thereby allowing the proponents to defend Proposition 54 in federal 
court, even if they — like BLAG — might lack actual standing.
However, Proposition 54’s Section 6.1 raises substantial 
questions under both federal and state law. First, under federal 
law, it is unclear that initiative proponents are analogous to BLAG. 
Initiative proponents are private citizens;132 by contrast, BLAG was 
126 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
127 Id. at 2683.
128 Id. at 2683-84.
129 Id. at 2684.
130 Id. at 2686, 2688.
131 See Proposition 54, supra note 6, § 6.1.
132 See Cal. Const. art. II, § 8(a) (“The initiative is the power of the electors to 
propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution . . .”).
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a governmental entity.133 Hollingsworth held this distinction to be all-
important: “We have never before upheld the standing of a private 
party to defend the constitutionality of a state statute when state 
officials have chosen not to. We decline to do so for the first time 
here.”134 Even if the proponents could be treated as BLAG-type 
intervenors, Section 6.1 does not require the Attorney General to file 
an answer in the U.S. District Court. Without an answer, the District 
Court must enter the defendant’s default.135 Proponents may appeal 
a subsequent default judgment,136 but the record on appeal would 
contain little on which to reverse a judgment of the initiative’s 
invalidity.137 In other words, allowing a proponent to participate in 
an appeal — via the Attorney General’s notice of appeal — might 
be a hollow victory, unless the proponent was allowed to develop 
evidence at trial on which an appeals court could hold the initiative 
to be valid.
Presumably, proponents could cure this specific problem 
by redrafting Section 6.1 to provide, in Government Code Section 
12511.7(c), that “the Attorney General shall nonetheless file 
an answer sufficient to prevent entry of a default”138 as well as a 
133 See Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2684.
134 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). On the other hand, 
the Attorney General’s filing of a notice of appeal might allow an initiative’s 
proponents to become amici and thereby assert via written briefs and oral 
argument the initiative’s validity, despite the proponents’ lack of standing. See 
Fed. R. App. P. 29. Even if proponents could not appear as amici, an Attorney 
General’s failure to file a brief only means that the Attorney General “will 
not be heard at oral argument unless the court grants permission.” Fed. R. 
App. P. 31(c). The circuit court would still decide the appeal on the merits 
and would not automatically decide against the party failing to file a brief. See 
Carvalho v. Equifax Info. Servs., 629 F.3d 876, 887 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010).
135 Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
136 See, e.g., Calumet Lumber, Inc. v. Mid-Am. Indust., Inc., 103 F.3d 612, 614-15 
(7th Cir. 1997).
137 See Fed. R. App. P. 10(a).
138 Mandating this type of minimal, noncommittal answer is intended to 
accommodate both of the following: (a) an elected attorney general’s right 
to refuse to defend an initiative that the attorney general believes to be 
unconstitutional, and (b) the litigation’s still proceeding on the merits — 
i.e., without entry of a default — and the initiative’s proponents having an 
opportunity to intervene. See, e.g., infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text. 
For example, in litigation over Los Angeles County’s Measure B, the defendant 
County officials did not plead that Measure B was constitutional, but did 
answer that the plaintiffs’ complaint “presents important constitutional 
questions that require and warrant judicial determination”; Measure B’s 
proponents successfully intervened, and the litigation continued on the 
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notice of appeal. Such a filing is critical in the Ninth Circuit, where 
an initiative proponent might then be permitted to intervene as 
a defendant, even if the proponent lacked standing on his or her 
own. 139 Still, while this Section 6.1 may be a ticket to the federal 
courthouse, it nonetheless poses a state law concern: California’s 
Attorney General has a right not to defend a state law. This principle 
was established in People ex rel. Deukmejian v. Brown.140
In Deukmejian, California’s Attorney General advised a state 
agency regarding an underlying state court lawsuit filed against the 
agency, alleging that the agency was attempting to implement an 
unconstitutional statute.141 One week after advising the agency, 
the Attorney General himself sued the agency, also seeking to have 
the statute declared unconstitutional on the same grounds as the 
underlying lawsuit.142 The California Supreme Court enjoined the 
Attorney General from proceeding, holding that he could not sue 
his own former client — the state agency — especially after he 
advised the agency regarding the very law at issue.143 However, the 
court also held that the Attorney General, who is an independently 
elected constitutional officer, “cannot be compelled to represent 
state officers or agencies if he believes them to be acting contrary to 
merits. See Defendants’ Answer to Plaintiffs’ Complaint at 1, Vivid Entm’t 
LLC v. Fielding, No. CV 13-00190 (AGI) (C.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2013), ECF no. 
21; see also supra note 68 (citing Manheim et al., supra note 15, at 1123-27 & 
nn.281, 286 & 299-300); Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 965 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 
1121-22 (C.D. Cal. 2013), aff ’d, 774 F.3d 566, 573 (9th Cir. 2014). 
139 See State of Cal. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Thompson, 321 F.3d 835, 845-46 & n.9 
(9th Cir. 2003). But see Appel, supra note 52, at 270 (not all circuits allow such 
piggyback standing). Even in the Ninth Circuit, an intervenor on the defense 
side might be limited to seeking the same relief sought by the defendants 
with standing. Cf. Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, Inc., ___ U.S. __, 2017 
U.S. LEXIS 3555 at *2, *4 (Jun. 5, 2017) (“[A]n intervenor of right must 
have Article III standing in order to pursue relief that is different from that 
which is sought by a party with standing.”) (involving attempt by party to 
intervene as a plaintiff under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2)). If the 
defendants with standing and the intervening proponents seek only the same 
relief — such as a judgment that the initiative is constitutional — then Town of 
Chester’s limitation would be moot. On the other hand, if the defendants and 
intervenors were to seek different relief — say, the defendants sought only 
to validate parts of an initiative, while the intervening proponents sought to 
validate the entire initiative — then Town of Chester might limit the intervenors 
to the relief sought by defendants.
140 624 P.2d 1206, 1207 (Cal. 1981).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 1210.
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law, and he may withdraw from his statutorily imposed duty to act 
as their counsel . . . .”144 This right not to defend the state is based, 
at least in part, on the Attorney General’s common law powers to 
protect “the public interest,” which may conflict with the obligation 
to represent state agencies or officials.145
Applying Deukmejian to Proposition 54’s Section 6.1 poses a 
fundamental question: May an initiative force an Attorney General to 
file an answer or a notice of appeal if the Attorney General believes 
that the initiative is unconstitutional (so that an answer or appeal 
would be contrary to “the public interest”)? Stated differently, would 
a court mandate that an Attorney General answer or appeal when he or 
she believes that no good-faith basis exists for the answer or appeal?
No definitive answer exists. Part of the difficulty here is that 
Deukmejian’s discussion of the Attorney General’s powers cited to 
both the State constitution and State statutes.146 Perhaps, then, 
an initiative that included a constitutional amendment to require 
the Attorney General to file an answer or notice of appeal would 
effectively overrule Deukmejian, thus compelling filing of an answer 
or notice of appeal despite the Attorney General’s beliefs about 
the initiative.147 Proposition 54’s Section 6.1, however, specifically 
amends a statute — namely, the Government Code — so it is 
questionable whether it would override the California Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Deukmejian.
144 Id. at 1209.
145 Deukmejian, 624 P.2d at 1207, 1209 (citing D’Amico v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 
520 P.2d 10, 20 (1974)).
146 Deukmejian, 624 P.2d at 1209.
147 Proponents seeking to qualify such initiatives (which contain constitutional 
mandates) for statewide ballots may face practical hurdles in states where 
constitutional initiatives require more signatures than statutory ones. For 
example, in California, initiatives amending the state’s constitution currently 
require almost 220,000 more signatures than statutory initiatives. See Cal. 
Const. art. II, § 8(b) (requiring signatures of eight percent of the total votes 
cast in the most recent gubernatorial election for constitutional initiatives, 
but only five percent for statutory initiatives); Statement of Vote, Cal. Sec’y of 
State 6 (Nov. 4, 2014), http://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2014-general/
pdf/2014-complete-sov.pdf (reporting that approximately 7.32 million 
votes were cast in the most recent gubernatorial election). Accordingly, 
a constitutional initiative — including one where the only constitutional 
provision is the Attorney General’s obligation to file an answer or a notice 
of appeal — might cost $1 million more than a purely statutory initiative for 
signature gathering. See, e.g., Caragozian, supra note 26, at 695 & n.50 (noting 
that signature gatherers charge $3 to $5 or more per signature).
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Conclusion
Considerable reason exists for skepticism toward the 
capacity of Proposition 60’s Section 7 — which threatened to fine 
an initiative’s proponent for a partially or wholly invalid initiative — 
to create personal standing for the proponent. The prospect of a 
$10,000 penalty is uncertain, and in addition, courts are likely to 
deem the penalty self-inflicted. Moreover, there is reason to question 
the validity of scholars’ bounty and refund variations: (1) a bounty 
would appear to have no limits on who could have standing and also 
departs substantially from the traditional qui tam structure; and (2) 
a refundable filing fee would be available only in states that impose 
and retain fees, and further, might be outside the logic of traditional 
standing.148 Less ambiguity, however, attends Proposition 60’s Section 
10, which purports to allow the proponent to represent the state and 
assume the state’s standing. That provision appears to be invalid 
under (a) the California Constitution’s bar on initiatives naming a 
person to hold office; and (b) Article III in making Proposition 60’s 
proponent a state employee in name only without Hollingsworth’s 
substantive attributes such as responsiveness to limited resources 
and changes in public opinion. Accordingly, initiative drafters in 
California and other states authorizing initiatives should refrain 
148 Until courts rule otherwise, of course, none of these approaches can be 
categorically dismissed. Also, little disadvantage would appear to result from 
including such provisions in future initiatives (except for the disadvantage 
of the proponent perhaps being liable to pay the fine under provisions like 
Proposition 60’s Section 7). Accordingly, absent definitive future case law to 
the contrary, initiative drafters’ best practices might now include language — 
adapted from Proposition 60 — similar to the following (along with the 
Proposition 60’s Section 9 severability language):
The People of this State hereby declare that the proponent of this 
[Initiative] shall be held civilly liable in the event this [Initiative] 
is struck down, after passage, by a court for being constitutionally 
or statutorily impermissible. Such an impermissible [Initiative] is a 
misuse of taxpayer funds and electoral resources and the [Initiative]’s 
proponent, as the drafter must be held accountable.
In the event this [Initiative], after passage, is struck down, in 
whole or in part, as unconstitutional or statutorily invalid, and all 
avenues for appealing the court decision have been exhausted, the 
proponent shall pay a civil penalty of $10,000 to the State for failure 
to draft a wholly constitutionally or statutorily permissible initiative. 
No party of entity may waive this civil penalty.
 See Proposition 60, supra note 2, § 7. Comparable language could be crafted for 
monetary rewards and refundable filing fees.
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from including such representational standing provisions.
Less reason for skepticism exists with regard to the gist of 
Proposition 54’s Section 6.1 mandate that the Attorney General file 
a notice of appeal. If, as set forth in Part III above, Section 6.1 is 
revised in two important ways — (1) the mandate is added to the 
state constitution, not to a statute; and (2) the Attorney General 
is required to file an answer (even if just a pro forma one149), as 
well as a notice of appeal — initiative proponents may participate 
in federal litigation. More specifically, proponents in circuits that 
allow piggyback standing, such as the Ninth Circuit, could intervene 
as defendants at trial, and proponents in all circuits may be allowed 
to brief and argue as amici on appeal, despite their lack of actual 
standing. To be sure, such participation would be less robust than 
that of full-fledged defendants and appellants, but Hollingsworth’s 
standing restrictions may leave initiative proponents few alternatives.
149 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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